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In force since 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
established one of the world's largest free trade areas, impacting almost a half
billion people in North America.' Evaluations of NAFTA have largely come from
2 3the perspective of the three member parties, pointing in multiple directions.
Much of the debate within the legal community centers on NAFTA's dispute
settlement, a functional example of what political scientists call international
legalization.4
Legalization of international law is understood as the coordinated attempts to
JD ITAM-Mexico, JSM and JSD Candidate, Stanford Law School. The author is especially
grateful for the valuable commentaries of Andrea K. Bjorklund, M. N. Hobstetter, Manuel
Gomez, Allen S. Weiner, Kimberly Morris and to the editors of the Santa Clara Journal of
International Law.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 702
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. J. Enrique Espinosa & Jaime Serra, Diez Ahos del Tratado de Libre Comercio de America
del Norte, in I EL NUEVO MILENIO MEXICANO 163 (Pascual Garcia Alba Idunata et al.
eds., 2004). See also Redacci6n, Destaca EU beneficio del TLC para Mexico, REFORMA,
Nov. 20, 2003, at 8A (quoting Robert Zoellick who stated "NAFTA has been a contributor
in the democratization process of Mexico").
3. See Joint Publication, NAFTA: A Decade of Strengthening a Dynamic Relationship,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2003/ (concluding that NAF1A
"is an outstanding demonstration of the rewards to outward-looking countries that
implement policies of trade liberalization as a way to increase wealth and improve
competitiveness"). See also NAFTA's Promise and Reality: Lessons from Mexico for the
Hemisphere, Carnegie Endowment Report Nov. 2003, available at http:// www. ceip.org/
files/pdf/ (concluding that NAFTA has brought little benefit to the Mexican economy).
4. Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study, 54
INT'L ORG. 519 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics].
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strengthen the binding character, the enforceability, and the capacity to compel
states' behavior through the adoption of precise obligations and the creation of
dispute resolution mechanisms. Many legal doctrines, such as the sovereign
immunity doctrine, the act of state doctrine, concepts of comity, and other legal
barriers, undermine the ability of national courts to exercise this function
effectively. Legalization includes three dimensions: obligation, precision, and
delegation. Obligation means that states are bound by a rule or commitment and
that behavior is subject to scrutiny under international law, and often under
domestic law as well. Precision means that rules unambiguously describe the
conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. And delegation means that third
parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply rules, to
resolve conflicts and to make new rules.
5
NAFTA is an example of legalization in international law and trade regulation
and, for some authors, the triumph of legalization as the preferred method of
international economic integration. 6 The NAFTA-style model of legalization has,
as its main features, a high degree of precision and obligation of legal norms as
well as a moderate degree of delegation of decision-making authority.
Recently, scholars writing under the liberal school of international law theory
have posed strong claims that the future of enforcement in international law is
through domestic mechanisms, given the ability to affect, influence, bolster and
even order specific actors in domestic politics. 7  This school of thought has
celebrated the ability of international law to constrain and guide political
behavior, 8 the decision-making processes,9 and to limit strategic bargaining in
political behavior at the national level.' 0
5. Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter &
Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000).
6. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics, supra note 4, at 520.
7. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 350 (2006).
8. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics, supra note 4, at 520-21.
9. Similarly, some scholars see international law and international legalization as a tool for
internal democratization. See generally Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
291 (1999).
10. The second effect of legalization - strategic bargaining in political behavior - should be
understood in opposition to normative persuasion. The content of this attribution is not
value-free since it implies that international law affects conduct not simply because it is
costly or undesirable, but because it is wrong or unjust. In other words, political behavior
follows from the value actor's commitment to principled beliefs as opposed to exclusive
rational choice considerations based on cost-benefit calculations. See Kenneth W. Abbott
& Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against
Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD., 141, 149 (2002).
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Through assessing the dispute resolution mechanisms of NAFTA and using data
produced in the proceedings, this paper analyzes the extent to which NAFTA has
served as a source of constraint and guidance for bureaucratic decision-making
processes, as the liberal scholars claim. This analysis is limited to Mexico, the
weakest party to the agreements - given that in the unequal exchange and
negotiations of the Agreement, Mexico viewed NAFTA not only as a necessary
step for economic transformation, but also as a potential tool for locking in the new
economic model and as a source of political transformation. This research has
placed particular emphasis on exploring three instants of potential policy
divergence with NAFTA: 1) the 1995 Mexican peso crisis; 2) Vicente Fox's rise to
power, ending seventy-one years in which the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) controlled the executive branch; and 3) the political crisis resulting from the
2006 presidential election. In general terms, this article seeks to analyze the
following question: How does legalization of international economic law affect the
behavior of the Mexican government? This paper intends to embrace the
complexity of the question and to resist the temptation to value ends over
explanation.
A. Structural Changes in Mexico in the Early Nineties
Responding to calls by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank for liberalization of the Mexican economy, the Salinas Administration
(1988-1994) implemented a wave of market-oriented reforms, starting in 1984
with the accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed
by his predecessor. 1 Under the Presidency of Carlos Salinas, Mexico took
decisive internal and external steps to liberalize its economy, open its market to
foreign trade and investment, reduce the state role in the economy, and establish
rule-based principles for business activity. The reforms reached their peak with the
adoption of NAFTA, which was signed on December 17, 1992, and entered into
effect on January 1, 1994.
Prior to NAFTA, Mexico adopted an aggressive series of reforms that either
permitted Mexico to gain the benefits of the Agreement or were indispensable in
coordinating the new legal framework made necessary by entering into the
Agreement. Following renegotiation of Mexico's external debt, the Mexican
Government took the following measures, among others:
May 1989. Mexico altered the foreign direct investment regime by enacting a
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATTI].
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new set of regulations which allowed 100 percent foreign ownership in a number
of sectors and created a new council (Consejo Mexicano de Inversi6n) as a
mechanism to promote foreign investment in Mexico. 12
December 1989. Mexico adopted a new "Maquiladora Decree," enacted to
promote the establishment of in-bond plants for exporting industries.' 
3
December 1990. President Salinas sent an initiative to the Congress to reform
the Mexican Constitution to allow for privatization of banks. Mexican commercial
banks were opened to some foreign investment and returned to private hands by
May of 1990. Between 1991 and 1992, the process for divestiture of all eighteen
banks was completed. 14
June 1991. Mexico adopted the Industrial Property Law and created the
Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) as the intellectual property
authority.1 5
January 1992. The government reformed Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution to permit a foreign corporation to own rural and agricultural lands and
to eliminate some restrictions on transfer of ejidos, or "communal land" property.' 6
December 1993. Mexico amended its expropriation law to increase protection
and security of property. 17
December 1993. Mexico enacted antitrust legislation and created a Federal
Competition Commission to serve as the Mexican antitrust authority, which aimed
to promote competition and make it easier for enterprises to enter new markets
previously dominated by powerful state-endorsed domestic enterprises.
18
12. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n
Extranjera, DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACION (Mexican Official Gazzette) [Foreign
Investment Regulations] 16 de mayo de 1989 (Mex.) [hereinafter D.O.]. Dr. Jaime Serra,
the Secretary of Trade and Industry in 1989, summarized the new Mexican philosophy as
"embracing foreign partners [as evidenced] in the sweeping liberalization of the regulations
governing foreign investment - as well as the deregulation and privatization of major
economic sectors- and other profoundly important policy initiatives." Promotional
Brochure, (Mexico Investment Board) Oct. 1991, 3, (document on file with author).
13. Decreto que Establece Programas de Importaci6n Temporal para Producir Articulos de
Exportaci6n, [Decree amending the Programs for the Temporal Imports to Produce in
Mdxico Export Goods], as amended, D.O., 29 de diciembre de 1993 (Mex.).
14. PEDRO AsPE, ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION THE MEXICAN WAY 90 (1993).
15. Ley de la Propiedad Industrial [Intellectual Property Law], D.O., 27 de junio de 1991
(Mex.).
16. Reforma que modifica el articulo 27 de la Constituci6n Politica de los E.U.M.
[Amendments to article 27 of Mexican Constitution], D.O., 6 de enero de 1992 (Mex.).
17. Decreto por el que se Reforman, Adicionan y Derogan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley de
Expropiaci6n [Decree that Modifies and Amends the Law on Expropriation], D.O., 22 de
diciembre de 1993 (Mex.).
18. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [Economic Competition Federal Law], D.O., 24 de
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December 1993. The government adopted a new Law on Foreign Investment,
which elevated protection of foreign investors and their investments and allowed
foreign investment in most of the economic sectors, replacing a twenty-year-old
law.' 9
During that same period the Mexican Congress authorized the reformation and
restructuring of many government agencies to facilitate interaction with newly
created agencies and counterparts in Canada and the US. The Secretariat for
Commerce and Industry (SECOFI, which is currently known as Secretaria de
Economia) was granted broad powers to implement the agreement and to interact
with foreign authorities. Other Secretariats such as Hacienda y Crdito Pzblico
(Tax Authority)20 and Relaciones Exteriores (Foreign Affaires) and the newly
decentralized Banco de Mxico (Central Bank)2' were granted functional powers
consistent with the new economic model and regional trade relationship.
B. The early effects of the NAFTA
In economic terms, the three economies of North America have grown during
the first decade of NAFTA. The average annual real GDP growth over the period
1994-2004 was 3.6 percent for Canada, 3.3 percent for the United States, and 2.7
percent for Mexico (despite the serious recession in 1995). 22 Both trade and
investment grew considerably during this same period of time. The constant
growth in terms of the GDP has to be analyzed with caution since it cannot, by any
measure, be considered exceptional for Mexico. For example, compared to the 35-
year dictatorship (1876-1911) in which Mexico grew at a faster rate than the
United States, Mexican growth is slow. 23 Despite much criticism, opinions suggest
that NAFTA has helped Mexico achieve levels of development closer to that of its
diciembre de 1992 (Mex.).
19. Nueva Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera [New Foreign Investment Law], D.O., 27 de diciembre
de 1993 (Mex.).
20. An example of this is the audit process and the recommended verification procedures.
Article 506 of the NAFTA sets out the authority for each Party to the Agreement to conduct
verifications of the books and records of the exporter or producer located in the territory of
another NAFTA Party. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 506.
21. See Nueva Ley del Banco de Mexico, D.O. Dec. 23, 1993 (New law of the Mexican Central
Bank) (granting the Central Bank autonomy and decentralized from the direct presidential
control).
22. G.C. Hufbauer, Notes on Speech "Assessing NAFTA, CAFTA and the FTAA", Foundation
Conference North American Agriculture: Assessing NAFTA at 12 Friday, Jan. 13, 2006:
Sacramento, California, available at http://giannini.ucop.edu/HufbauerNAFTA.pdf.
23. Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer, THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS:
POLITICAL INSTABILITY, CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MEXICO:
1876- 1929, 48 (Cambridge University Press 2003).
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partners, and that NAFTA has had positive impacts on the number and quality of
jobs in Mexico.24
Since the beginning of NAFTA's enforcement, trade between Mexico, the US,
and Canada has grown considerably. According to G.C. Hufbauer, the total two-
way US-Mexico merchandise trade has grown 227 percent. Likewise, US-Canada
trade has continued its robust expansion inspired by Can-US FTA.25 Since 1989,
US exports to and US imports from Canada rose 140 percent and 190 percent
respectively; however, total US-Canada trade roughly kept pace with trade growth
in the rest of the world. Trade with NAFTA partners in 2004 accounted for 31
percent of the total US trade, but more than 80 percent of Mexico's trade involves
26the NAFTA region.
Foreign investment trends, particularly in Mexico, show an upswing after
NAFTA. There is no clear evidence on whether NAFTA was the main causal
reason for this increase or if it was the result of a general worldwide increase in
FDI, the growth of the U.S. economy during these years, or the 1995 Mexican
financial crisis. The displacement of foreign investment, mainly from the United
States but also from Canada, into Mexico was a real phenomenon; however, some
analysts suggest that this displacement was more a response to the productive
adjustments stemming from the globalization of the world economy rather than to
NAFTA itself.
2 7
Thus, NAFTA evidently produced a stronger economic link and convergence
between the three North American economies.28 In some sectors, there is clear
evidence the liberalization process has had a positive effect. For example,
evidence suggests that foreign banks have been better able to screen borrowers and
charge lower interest margins than domestic banks. Better financial options have
derived from increased bank administrative efficiency. The implication is that
foreign banks' entry after liberalization reforms produced welfare gains to
consumers in Mexico.29
24. Lederman, Maloney & Serven, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean
Countries: A Summary of Research Findings, at V (The World Bank Dec. 2003).
25. Hufbager, Gary Clyde and Jeffery J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment, Institute for
International Economics (Washington D.C. 1993).
26. Id.
27. Mattar et al., "Foreign Investment in Mexico After Economic Reform," in Estudios y
Perspectivas 37-38 (CEPAL ed., 2002).
28. See Mexico: Canada's Other Nafta Partner, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs of Canada, 3 Mar. 2004, available at http:// www. parl.gc.ca/ 37/3/ parlbus/
commbus/senate/Com-e/fore-E/rep-e/rep03marO4-e.htm. See also Espinosa & Serra Puche,
supra note 2, at 23-31.
29. Stephen Haber & Aldo Musacchio, Foreign Banks and the Mexican Economy, 1997-2004,
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The economic implications of NAFTA help set up a framework to analyze the
real question that this paper explores; they show how, from an economic point of
view, NAFTA delivered nothing unexpected by serious analysts. 30  Less clear,
however, is the extent to which NAFTA has affected governmental behavior. How
national decision-making of the Mexican government has been affected since
1994, and to what extent this is the result of the NAFTA and reforms triggered by
the Agreement, is less clear and seldom analyzed. These questions are explored
below.
C. Legalization and International Law Compliance
1. Observation Sample: Dispute Settlement Mechanism As Evidence of
State behavior
Observing a causal relationship between a normative framework and political
behavior is not an easy task. Econometrics and statistical inference are helpful
tools if adequate data is available. For the purpose of this work, data seems to be
inadequate for a sophisticated empirical analysis. 31 Instead a "multiple-case"
32
study methodology, adequate to develop a better explanatory framework, and to
refine theories, has been suggested for similar types of analysis. 33 The process-
tracing followed is also helpful to understand links between the factors studied and
political behavior.
Dispute settlement mechanisms created under international agreements not only
serve as a threat to the discretion of political leaders but also contribute in the
ability to monitor compliance with an international agreement and to understand
the behavior of state actors. International proceedings under these mechanisms can
also be an important source of information about political conduct and help trace
behavior. In other words, dispute settlement mechanisms may have an
Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.stanford.edu/-haber/papers/HaberandMusacchio-
ForeignBanks-andtheMexicanEconomy, 1997-2004.pdf.
30. Hufbauer, supra note 25, at 10.
31. For an example of an empirical analysis in this field, see e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, (June 2002).
32. Methodological design deals with the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to
its conclusion. In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" and "why"
questions are being posed. A multiple-case analysis follows a replication logic. It serves to
explore similar results and to compare and contrast predictable different results in the
presence of different circumstances
33. Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Influence, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 140 (Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert K.
Kin, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (Sage 1994).
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informational function.
NAFTA includes a unique package of dispute mechanisms covering regional
trade and investment. The agreement presents a quasi-judicial approach, based on
international mechanisms, that incorporate elements of court proceedings and
arbitration panels. However, NAFTA avoided trilateral judicial mechanisms such
as those in the European Union or permanent international tribunals such as the
ICJ. 34 NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions cover foreign investment, financial
services, appeals on antidumping and countervailing duty actions, and state-to-state
disputes.35 Each of these provisions has affected policy autonomy differently.
NAFTA mechanisms resemble other international instruments entered into by
the United States. For example, NAFTA mirrors the Can-US FTA as to the
resolution of state-to-state disputes as well as antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations. The investor-state mechanism was borrowed from many bilateral
36treaties existent at the time. Some provisions included in NAFTA have been
included in other regional agreements entered into independently by Mexico and
the US - most notably with CAFTA37 but also with the Mex-Japan FTA.3 8 Two
other mechanisms related to NAFTrA, the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC) 39 and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC), 40 also provide for proceedings that review the failure to
enforce the labor and environmental provisions established therein.4'
34. Cf. John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of The North American Free Trade Agreement: A
Comparative Analysis of the Role Of Regional Economic Institutions and the
Harmonization of Law in North America and Western Europe, 19 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 1
(1996) (concluding that NAFTA does not provides for a "regional judicial institution with
the authority to provide independent and uniform interpretations of international obligations
and to definitively resolve disputes in a legalistic manner").
35. See generally Meg Kinnear, Andrea K Bjorklund, and John F.G. Hannaford, INVESTMENT
DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11 (2006).
Section of the Treaty Type of Dispute
Chapter 20 General treaty obligations
Chapter 19 Unfair trade law enforcement
Chapter 14 Financial services
Chapter 11 Foreign investment
36. Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 421, 422 (2000).
37. U.S. Trade Representative Draft Text of U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Cafta/text/index.htm.
38. Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the
Economic Partnership (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/
mexico/agreement/index.html.
39. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 14 Sept. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
40. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 14 Sept. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
41. NAAEC is directed at fostering the protection and improvement of the environment,
370
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In a general sense, the practice of the dispute mechanism serves as a useful
source of information about states' behavior. Yet, analyzing only the practice is
not conclusive for finding whether international obligations have actually (as
opposed to theoretically) affected government behavior. This kind of analysis,
however, can provide a good sense of the state of affairs with respect to
compliance and political behavior adjustment to international law.
D. The Balance of NAFTA 's Disputes Settlement Mechanisms 1994-2006
1. Chapter 11: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Of the four dispute settlement mechanisms of NAFTA, Chapter 11 (Investment)
has been the most controversial. Approximately forty-four notices of intent to
submit claims to arbitration have been reported. Only four actions have resulted in
violations of Chapter !1, where one of the Parties had committed violations of
NAFTA: two against the Mexican Government, and two against the Canadian
Government.42 Three arbitral decisions and one consolidation order have been
reviewed by courts at the site of arbitration: the Metalclad, S.D. Myers and
Feldman awards, and the order in the softwood consolidation proceeding.
Governments have duly complied with the tribunals' resolutions in a timely
manner in all cases.43 Cases like Azinian, Waste Management, Gami, Mondev,
ADF, Thunderbird, Fireman's Fund and Loewen resulted in the dismissal of the
allegations against the governments."
The huge improvements in the degree of transparency of the mechanisms under
improving conservation efforts, promoting sustainable development, and increasing
cooperation on and enhanced enforcement of environmental laws and policies. NAALC
aims to improve working conditions and living standards, to foster compliance with and
effective enforcement of labor laws.
42. Governments have been found responsible in: Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID (W. Bank), Award (30 Aug. 2000) (per curiam) reprinted in 16 INT'L ARB. REP. 62
(Jan. 2001), paras. 101-12; in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (10 Apr. 2001) (Award on the
Merits Second Phase) (per curiam) para. 195; in S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada (21 Oct. 2002)
(Second Interim Award) (per curiam), paras. 318-19; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa et al. v.
The Government of Mexico, Final Award, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1,
16 Dec. 2002, para. 96.
43. Currently, in the case of International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican
States, the respondent is seeking to vacate the arbitral award and therefore, the award will
be reviewed -to a limited extent- by a judge in Washington, DC, the place of arbitration.
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL) 26 Jan. 2006, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itnaward.
pdf.
44. Id.
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Chapter 11 have helped to overcome much of the controversy and skepticism
towards Chapter 11 arbitrations. During the last three years, there has been greater
access to information about the disputes, the initial basis for much of its criticism
against Chapter 11.
45
2. Chapter 19: Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Actions Revision
Mechanism
Chapter 19 is the most utilized mechanism available under NAFTA. As of
December 2006, the mechanism has had 108 filings under its provisions. In
addition, Chapter 19 has seen the highest number of rendered decisions with a total
of 50. Out of the total number of filings 35 were terminated by the parties and the
rest are currently pending. There are also eight decisions pending. Out of the
claims filed, 72 were against U.S. authorities, 20 against Canada, and 16 against
46Mexican authorities. Around 85 percent of the cases refer to dumping and
related issues; 15 percent concern subsides. It is also interesting to note that the
disputes have centered on relatively few sectors, such as metallurgy, construction,
foods and agricultural products, and chemicals and manufacturers.
In contrast to other dispute mechanisms of the agreement, Chapter 19 is the
most transparent. Proceedings are widely open, and with the exception of
confidential business information contained therein, briefs, hearings, preliminary
decisions, as well as final decisions are made public on a timely basis.
3. Chapter 20: State-to-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Only three NAFTA disputes have tested the complete course of the state-to-
state dispute mechanism established in Chapter 20. 4 In the first, the United States
activated the mechanism against Canada, alleging that under NAFTA Canada's
tariff on dairy products were subject to a tariffication and subsequent elimination
45. See Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation,
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (7 Oct. 2003), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Nondisputing-en.pdf (establishing guidelines for submissions from
non-disputing parties in all cases; Canada and the United States affirmed that they will
consent to open public hearings in all Chapter 11 arbitrations).
46. See Status Report NAFTA & FTA Dispute Settlement Proceedings, available at
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/indexe.aspx?DetailID=9 (last visited Mar. 23,
2007).
47. David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA's Chapter
20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481, 490 & 518 (2002)
(referring to a dispute brought under the Softwood Lumber Agreement, May 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1195, to resolve a long-running dispute between Canada and the United States over
Canada lumber exports to the United States).
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within 15 years. The panel ultimately determined unanimously that Canada's
actions were consistent with NAFTA.as In the second case, Mexico brought an
action against the United States based on the United States's application of a
safeguard to brooms made of corn fibers. Under Mexico's view, the safeguard, as
applied by the U.S. International Trade Commission, did not meet the standards
required to establish the domestic industry injury required by NAFTA.49 The
Panel unanimously agreed with Mexico. 50 The third decision under Chapter 20 is
the famous Cross Border Trucking Services case, in which the Panel agreed with
Mexico that the "U.S. blanket refusal to review and consider for approval any
Mexican-owned carrier applications for authority to provide cross-border trucking
services was and remains a breach of the U.S. obligations."
5
'
In spite of being actively used during the first years of NAFTA, the mechanism
for state-to-state disputes under Chapter 20 has not presented a new case since
2001. Given that the arbitral panel process contemplates the use of a standing
roster of ten international legal experts designated by each NAFTA party, and that
the roster of members was not formed until this year the process and the
mechanism's effectiveness was undermined. It may be the reason for the relatively
few disputes submitted to arbitration under NAFTA. Without the roster, the
constitution of the panel depended on the agreement of both of the states, difficult
to gain once a disagreement has been triggered. 2
II. Environmental and Labor Side Agreements Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms
The environmental side of the Agreement created a Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) whose principal task is to investigate citizens'
complaints that the NAFTA parties have failed to enforce their environmental laws
48. Id. at 515. See also Final Report of the Panel in the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to
Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, 1997 Bdielad Lexis 24 (Dec. 2, 1996).
49. In the dispute, the United States complied with the decision only after nine months. For
that reason, Mexico applied retaliatory tariffs to a series of U.S. products, like high fructose
corn syrup, until the U.S. lifted the safeguards. See AMERICAS TRADE, Dec. 24, 1998, at
8.
50. Id. See also Final Panel Report, in the Matter of the U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on
Broom Corn Brooms from Mexico (USA-97-2008-01), Jan. 30, 1998.
51. Id. at 516. See also Final Report of the Panel Case Concerning the Cross-Border Trucking
Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01, Feb. 6, 2001 295.
52. NAFTA, supra note 1, Arts. 1414-16. It worth noting that Chapter 14 (Financial Services)
of NAFTA relating mostly to banking, insurance and brokerage issues provides that Section
B of Chapter 20 and Chapter 11 shall apply, with some modifications, to the settlement of
disputes on financial services. No cases have tested this system.
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as the NAAEC requires. The citizen-submission process functions as another
"information" mechanism for governments' behavior, investigating the parties'
compliance with environmental laws and publishing its findings as factual records.
According to Slaughter and Hale, four of the twenty-six completed CEC cases
resulted in high levels of policy change and seven of these resulted in medium
levels of policy change.53
Finally, the labor side of the Agreement created the National Administrative
Offices (NAO). Citizens can submit claims to the NAO alleging that one of the
other governments has failed to effectively enforce its labor laws. If the NAO
decides to accept the submission, it may hold public hearings to gather information
about the complaints. Upon receiving the submission the Secretary of NAO may
then recommend that the NAFTA Party's Labor Ministers consult on the
submission. Close to thirty citizen submissions against member governments have
been presented. Most of the submissions have raised complaints against Mexican
authorities, the next largest number of submissions have been raised against the
United States. Two cases submitted by Maquiladora workers in 1997, 54 the most
renowned of these cases, involved union representation elections processes. As
consequence of the cases, Mexico agreed to promote the use of secret ballots in
union representation elections and to support the provision of information
pertaining to collective bargaining agreements.55
A. State Behavior in Critical Moments: The Case of Mexico
As explained before, this article has selected three critical points in Mexico's
recent history as case studies in analyzing states' behavior under NAFTA. During
these three periods, potential temptations existed that might have caused Mexico to
diverge from the economic choices required under NAFTA. These temptations
invited protectionist and discriminatory measures in contravention of international
obligations. More importantly, these instances demonstrated an increase in
political pressure and social tensions that required important public policy
decisions. The objective of the three cases is to identify some links between
political behavior and NAFTA in moments where sufficient internal political
53. Anne Marie Slaughter & Thomas N. Hale, Transparency: Possibilities and Limitations, 30:1
FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 153, 159 (2006).
54. See Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01933.pdf.
55. See Commission of Labor Cooperation, Public Communications Submitted to the United
States National Administrative Office (NAO) U.S. NAO 940001 and U.S. NAO 940002,
available at http://www.naalc.org/english/summaryusa.shtml.
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pressure has demanded actions potentially in conflict with the Agreement.
B. The 1995 devaluation crisis
In December 1994, after a year of political assassinations, a controversial
presidential election and an armed guerrilla movement in the impoverished
southern state of Chiapas, Mexico teetered on the edge of a foreign exchange
reserves crisis. In response, Mexico devalued the peso, sending the peso/dollar
exchange rate from 3.4 pesos per dollar to more than two times that rate, 7 pesos
per dollar. With almost no foreign currency reserves, huge liabilities convertible
into dollars and with no one willing to lend hard currency to Mexico for fear of
losing it in the clearly impending financial crisis, Mexico faced possible default on
payment of liabilities, hyperinflation and a probable depression. A relatively
successful peso rescue program, financed through a support package offered jointly
by the White House and the IMF, prevented a larger Mexican crisis.
5 6
Under these conditions Mexico faced severe domestic political pressure to take
some form of action to address the financial crisis. The likely measures would
potentially have isolated NAFTA by restricting trade liberalization and market
access. 57 Suggested responses included actions taken in previous economic crises
in Mexico; for example, in the 1970s and 1980s, restricting access to the internal
market and engaging in programs of nationalization. 58 In the middle of the 1982
crisis, President Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) nationalized private banks and
established foreign exchange controls. 59 Mexico's restrictive import policies, a
reaction to the oil prices debacle during the first quarter of 1982, were required to
sustain domestic production and they resulted in an unprecedented foreign trade
surplus.
56. See Juan R. Espafia, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Impact on NAFTA and Emerging Markets,
BUSINESS EcONOMICS, July 1995. Some economic commentators have suggested that had
the Clinton administration been willing and/or able to put together an aid package right after
the devaluation, the extent of the crisis would have been reduced significantly.
57. See, e.g., Speech by Jorge Andrds Ocejo Moreno on behalf of the PAN in front of
Congress's Permanent Commission requesting urgent trade protection for Mexican
production. Diario de los Debates, LVI Legislatura, Comisi6n permanente, Primer Afto de
Ejercicio, 4 de enero de 1995 available at http://cronica.diputados.gob.mxlDDebates/.
58. See Henry C. Schmidt, The Mexican Foreign Debt and the Sexennial Transition from L6pez
Portillo to De la Madrid, Mexican Studies / Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 1, No. 2. (Summer,
1985), 227-54. President Lopez Portrillo announced the nationalizationi of private banks
and the establishment of foreign exchange controls during the state-of-the nation address.
59. Decreto que Establece la Nacionalizaci6n de la Banca Privada, D.O. Sept. 1, 1982 (Bank's
Nationalization Decree) & Decreto que Establece el Control Generalizado de Cambios,
D.O. Sept. 1, 1982 (Foreign Exchange Controls' Decree).
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President Zedillo's 1995 rescue package responded to the devaluation crisis by
encouraging foreign investment and pointing to the importance of productive
investments for Mexico that would reduce the need for imports in an "efficient"
way. President Zedillo also announced a group of measures to deepen the
structural change in Mexico toward a flexible and competitive economy,
"particularly in those sectors that must be modernized quickly to encourage the
productivity and competitiveness of [the Mexican] economy." In the same speech
he "encourage[d] the participation of private investment in modernizing
infrastructure for development., 60  While a tempting option for the incoming
administration, the 1995 rescue package did not involve nationalization, market
access limitations, or exchange controls, as Mexico had formerly done in previous
crises and as was seen in Argentina's emergency package in 2001 61
The United States provided large-scale financial aid to Mexico during the peso
crisis and thereby relieved the pressure on the Mexican government to take
measures that might have been inconsistent with NAFTA. This can be seen as a
positive effect in the Mexico-United States relationship. NAFTA aligned the
common interests of both countries because they were better off cooperating to
solve Mexico's devaluation crisis. The U.S. government had an incentive to show
that the politically contentious NAFTA and the trade liberalization agenda were
correct political-economy courses of action.62 Furthermore, a great depression in
the Mexican economy one year after NAFTA's coming into force would have
undermined U.S. policy objectives for entering into such trade agreements, as well
as affected U.S. private interests in Mexico.63 To avoid this, it was important for
the U.S. to support Mexico during the peso devaluation crisis.
64
60. President Ernesto Zedillo, Address at Presidential Residence (Dec. 29, 1994), available at
http://zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/disc/dic-94.html.
61. See generally Timothy J. Kehoe, What Can We Learn From The Current Crisis In
Argentina? 50:5 SCOTISH J. POL. EcON., Nov. 2003.
62. Interview with A. S. Weiner, former U.S. State Department Counsel involved in the loan
negotiations between Mexico and the United States, Stanford, CA. (Jan. 27, 2007).
63. See Richard E. Feinberg, The Political Economy of United States' Free Trade
Arrangements, 26:7 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1019-40. According to Feinberg, four broad
objectives are pursued by the U.S. with this regional trade agreement: a) establishing an
asymmetric reciprocity that advantageously opens markets for US traders and investors; b)
establishing precedents, models or serving as catalysts for wider trade agreements; c)
rewarding and supporting domestic market-oriented reformers; and d) strengthening
strategic partnerships.
64. Bradford deLong et al, The Case for Mexico's Rescue; The Peso Package Looks Even
Better Now, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 1996, at 8 (stating that "as a consequence of the
crisis, guaranteed access to the U.S. market has become a more important determinant of
long-term investment in Mexico, and Mexico's demonstrated commitment to reform
policies has become more important for renewed growth").
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In this cooperative scenario, the decision of Mexican authorities to take a course
of action contrary to NAFTA would have been very costly for both the U.S. and
Mexico but appealing to the masses. It seems that the bureaucratic authorities
viewed NAFTA as a constraint on their policy discretion. For example, once the
financial misfortune had been ameliorated, the government faced the task of
rebuilding Mexico's financial and banking systems, which had been gravely
damaged as a result of the substantial volume of non-performing loans. The
Mexican government decided to do so through a program implemented by the
Fund for the Protection of Bank Savings (FOBAPROA). FOBAPROA intended to
quell the non-performing loan problems by taking over tranches (securitized
bonds) of the banks' non-performing loans and replacing them with government-
guaranteed notes. The program was implemented in spite of huge political
pressure in Mexico against the program, especially after the PRI lost control of the
Congress in 1997. This political pressure demanded discriminatory measures with
respect to dollar denominated debentures that would affect, among others, U.S.
investors. However, executive authorities were concerned that discriminatory
treatment could trigger a dispute, and "if the disputes [were] submitted to
international arbitration it was very likely that a tribunal would find breaches of
international obligations, and Mexico would lose and be compelled to pay
[compensation]. 65  In addition, the same authorities were "concern[ed] that
Mexico's reputation in their international investment community would suffer."
66
While some measures affected both Mexican and foreign investors, none of
these actions has resulted in a finding of discriminatory breaches to NAFTA, in
contrast to the measures taken by Argentina during the 2001 financial crisis. 6 7 In a
way, NAFTA and the potential of international responsibility helped bond the fate
of these two countries.
C. Vicente Fox's Presidential Victory and the Mexican Sugar Industry
The Mexican government went through a historic political change in 2000 when
Vicente Fox Quezada of the Partido de Acci6n Nacional (PAN) won the
65. Testimony of Eduardo Fernandez Garcia, president of the National Banking and Securities
Commission of Mexico submitted in Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/02/1, (NAFTA), Claimant's Memorial on the
Merits at para. 58.
66. Id.
67. Cf. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8 (US/Argentina BIT) Award, 12 May 2005, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/CMSFinalAwardOOO.pdf (condemning Argentina to pay the Claimant
compensation in the amount superior of US $133.2 million).
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presidential election on July 2, 2000. His victory represented the first time in
seventy-one years that the PRI had lost control of the executive branch. Fox's
election left Mexico with a divided government, as the PAN did not control the
Congress. Rather the opposition controlled the Congress's majority because the
PRI retained the greatest number of seats in the Congress and was in alliance with
another political party, the Partido de la Revoluci6n Democrdtica (PRD).
Vicente Fox (2000-2006) won the election promising to bring change to
Mexican institutions, increased accountability, efforts to end corruption, and
positive economic reforms to boost Mexico's development. Despite this
enthusiasm, President Fox was unable to deliver on these promises - the promises
that helped ensure his party's victory in the 2000 election.
President Fox faced many challenges in his first year as President of Mexico;
one of the most important involved the problems facing Mexico's sugar industry.
Mexico is the world's sixth largest producer of sugar. Sugar cane is the single
68largest crop cultivated in Mexico. Although highly inefficient, the sugar industry
has important political implications because around 30,000 workers are employed
in sugar mills and around 300,000, ten times that number, work in the fields as
growers and cutters. It is estimated that more than two million people depend on
this industry either directly or indirectly.
69
The low price of sugar precipitated this crisis. This low price, when combined
with the small U.S. import quotas offered to Mexico under NAFTA, the inability
of the industry to export Mexican surpluses at competitive prices, and increasing
competition from other sweeteners such as the High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
intensified the problem. In an attempt to reduce this problem and as result of
demand of the sugar industry, Mexico imposed antidumping duties on imports of
HFCS from the United States in 1998. However, both a WTO and a NAFTA panel
ruled against Mexico's imposition of these antidumping duties.70
In this context, Mexico was under an international obligation to lift the
68. International Sugar Statistics, http://www.illovosugar.com/worldofsugar/international
SugarStats.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
69. See Gami Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican States (NAFTA), UNCITRAL Final Award
15 November 2004, 46, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Gami.pdf.
70. Mexico-Antidumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United
States, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS132/RW, 135, 2001 WTO DS LEXIS 29 (Oct.
22, 2001) (holding that Mexico failed to implement the Panel's original recommendations
and ordering Mexico to conform to the obligations of GATT). See also Review of the Final
Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup,
Originating from the United States of America, Case: MEX-USA-98-1904-01, 112-13
(Aug. 3, 2001) (determining that the Mexican Investigating Authority failed to find a threat
of injury to Mexico's domestic sugar industry), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org.
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antidumping measure or face retaliation by the United States. At the same time it
needed to resolve the sectoral crisis. Mexican bureaucratic decision-makers faced
the problem of solving the sector crisis with little flexibility to use trade measures
as a result of the panels' findings.
In an attempt to address the crisis, the Fox administration made a controversial
decision - it expropriated twenty-seven sugar mills by presidential decree on
September 3, 2001.71 Although this expropriation decree was ultimately declared a
breach of the Mexican Constitution in national courts, 72 a Chapter 1 1 tribunal
found the expropriation decree was not inconsistent with NAFTA. While Article
1110 of NAFTA prohibits discriminatory expropriation without adequate
compensation,73 compensation was offered in the present case and no elements of
discriminatory intent inconsistent with NAFTA were found.74
In spite of the expropriation, pressures continued to mount from certain
members of the Mexican Congress to reduce competition from other sweeteners.
The Congress even proposed a ban on all imported HFCS and all yellow corn
imported for the production of HFCS.75 The Congress abandoned this idea
because trade measures like the one proposed would be in "direct" contravention to
NAFTA.76 Instead, the Congress approved a 20 percent ad valorem tax to transfers
(sales), imports, and services (such as distribution), in connection with the sale of
soft drinks or syrups made with HFCS. 77 Because almost the entire HFCS industry
71. Decreto por el que Se Expropian por Causa de Utilidad PNblica, a Favor de la Naci6n, las
Acciones, los Cupones y/o los Titulos Representativos del Capital o Partes Sociales de las
Empresas Propietarias de 27 Ingenios Azucareros. D.O., Sept. 3, 2001 (Sugar Industry
Expropriation Decree).
72. Carlos Avilds, Corte Anula Expropiaci6n de Ingenios Azucareros, Peri6dico El Universal,
17 de enero de 2006.
73. NAFTA, supra note 1, at article 1110.
74. Gami Award, supra note 71, at T 114 (establishing that "[t]he government may have been
clumsy in its analysis of the relevant criteria for the cutoff line between candidates and non-
candidates for expropriation. [...] But ineffectiveness is not discrimination [...] a reason
exists for the measure which was not itself discriminatory. That measure was plausibly
connected with a legitimate goal of policy (ensuring that the sugar industry was in the hands
of solvent enterprises) and was applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a
disguised barrier to equal opportunity").
75. Proyecto de Decreto que Prohibe la Importaci6n de Jarabe de Maiz de Alta Fructosa y de
Maiz Destinado a la Elaboraci6n de la Misma, Gaceta Parlamentaria, nfimero 84, Sept. 19,
2001 available at http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx.
76. This view has been confirmed, among others, by Senator Jose Castefteda (2001-2006).
Interview with Jose Castefleda, Senator in Mexican Congress, Mexico City, Mexico (July
12, 2004).
77. See Decreto por el que Se Reforman, Adicionan y Derogan Diversas Disposiciones de la
Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Produccirn y Servicios, Arts. 2, 3 and 8, D.O. l o de enero
de 2002 (explaining that under the IEPS Law, the tax paid by the bottler, distributor or
379
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in Mexico (both at the production and distribution levels) is foreign-owned, the tax
had an openly discriminatory intent.
78
By passing the HFCS Tax, the Mexican Congress took direct action relying on
fiscal prerogatives, perhaps in an attempt to shield the bill from challenges under
trade agreements.79 Political leaders in the Congress had previously attempted to
undermine competitors of the sugar industry in Mexico by employing similar
strategic behavior.8 0 Nonetheless, the HFCS Tax was found in breach of GATT by
a WTO panel and confirmed by its Appellate Body notwithstanding its fiscal
nature. It is likely to be declared inconsistent with the NAFTA as well. 8'
In several different instances, high-level officers of the Mexican government
expressed concern about this tax's consistency with international obligations and
made efforts to repeal it. The Fox Administration suspended the Tax, recognizing
the "unfavorable treatment" to foreign producers.82 In an unprecedented battle
over constitutional powers, the Supreme Court decided the executive branch lacked
the authority to suspend a tax measure adopted by the Congress and reinstalled the
Tax.
83
Reliance on international agreements in decision-making is evidenced by the
statements of government officials. For example, Mexico's Secretary of
Economia, Mr. Luis Ernesto Derbez, stated that "[the Tax] violates NAFTA in the
importers when they sell or import the soft drink or syrup can be credited against the tax
owed by their customers when their customers, in turn, sell the soft drink or syrup.
However, since the final consumer cannot obtain a credit from the price to any subsequent
consumer, the IEPS translates into a direct impact on the price of the soft drink).
78. Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages Report of the Panel
(WT/DS308/R) at 11.2.4 (finding Mexico's beverage tax inconsistent with Arts. 1I cl. 2
and HI cl. 4 of the GATT 1994).
79. See id., Observaciones de Mexico a los Comentarios de Estados Unidos al Informe
Preliminar. (where Mexico argued within the WTO that the tax was adopted as a legitimate
countermeasure and to secure compliance with law and regulations).
80. See Articulo Sexto Transitorio, Ley de Ingresos de la Federaci6n para el Ejercicio Fiscal de
2002, D.O., Jan. 1, 2002. In order to import corn duty-free to produce HFCS into Mexico, a
company must have a quota allocation, called cupos. The Mexican Congress changed the
system and restricted the budgetary and allocation authority of the executive branch for that
purpose.
81. Three investment disputes under chapter 11 of NAFIA remain. The claimants are Corn
Products, ADM/A.E.-Stanley, and Cargill, available at http://naftaclaims.comldisputes
mexico.htm.
82. Decreto por el que Se Exime del Pago de los Impuestos que Se Indican y Se Amplia el
Estimulo Fiscal que Se Menciona, D.O., Mar. 5, 2002.
83. Sentencia Relativa a la Controversia Constituciona 32/2002, Promovida por la C~mara de
Diputados Congreso de la Uni6n, en contra del Titular del Poder Ejecutivo Federal, D.O.
July 17, 2002. (Resolution Constitutional Challenge 32/2002 filed by the Chamber of
deputies against the President).
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section about investment protection and changes the rules of the game," these
changes would "have an impact on the legal framework that guarantees domestic
and international investments in Mexico. 84 Similar declarations were made by
other officers.85 This evidence suggests that the specific obligations of NAFTA
were indeed considered in this debate over the sugar industry determining the
appropriate course of action for Mexico and the executive's response.
The fact that the administrative power was unsuccessful in this battle presents
different and interesting questions of Mexican constitutional law, but for the
purpose of this work it is clear that both the Congress and the executive had in
mind an international legal framework while taking action on this issue. The
HFCS Tax was ultimately lifted in 2006 in compliance with the WTO appellate
body decision.86 Simply lifting the Tax, however, does not preclude liability for
87potential violations of Chapter 11 of NAFTA vis-A-vis foreign investors.
D. The Aftermath of the 2006 Election and The Political Unsteadiness of Corn.
The extremely contentious 2006 electoral campaign in Mexico, ultimately won
by Felipe Calder6n (2006-2012), resulted in a post-election conflict mounted by
the defeated candidate Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador (AMLO). The situation left
Mexico on the brink of major political and social turmoil. The campaigns of both
Calder6n and AMLO actively sought to exploit the country's deep social divisions,
and even encouraged these divisions at times. By charging massive election fraud
after losing by less than 0.6 percent of the votes, PRD candidate AMLO sparked a
political crisis in the young Mexican democracy.
AMLO had campaigned arguing against NAFTA and in favor of restricting
market access, in open opposition to Mexico's international obligations. On many
occasions AMLO expressed a defiant voice against NAFTA, promising action to
avoid compliance with international obligations, e.g. liberalization in sectors like
corn and beans, and taking action on foreign ownership of banks. 88 As a way of
84. Ministro de Economia Aseguro que el Impuesto a la Fructosa Violo Tratado, EFE News
Services, Mar. 7, 2002.
85. See Rebeca C~spedes, Critican Privilegio a Insumo, Peri6dico Reforma (Jan. 29, 2002)
(quoting Dr. Luis de la Calle, Under-Secretary for Trade Negotiatons).
86. See Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Producci6n y Servicios, Arts. 2, 3, 8, available at
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf78.pdf.
87. NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1135. Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, the investor may seek
monetary damages and any applicable interest or the restitution of property; however, it
cannot request the removal of the affecting measure or punitive damages.
88. Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador, Speech in Constitution Plaza of Mexico City, available at
http://www.amlo.org.mx/noticias/discursos/1609200601.doc ("We do not accept the clause
in the [North American] Free Trade Agreement by which in 2008 the imports, and
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forestalling a political impasse following the close presidential election, Calder6n
promised to incorporate some of the PRD's economic agenda into his
administration's agenda. In this context, political pressures to set back economic
liberalization in general, and NAFTA (as the symbol of liberalization) in particular,
have dramatically increased. Corn has been the new currency of this battle.
89
In the first days of 2007, Mexico has experienced a rise in consumer prices and
inflation, derived mainly from increases in corn prices. To control this, the PRD
has used political pressure to suggest a schedule of price controls on products like
corn and tortillas. However, noting Mexico's international obligations, Mexican
executive authorities have decided to limit price controls, and instead, to increase
the tariff-free import quotas of corn allocated under NAFTA. In addition,
authorities have sought to attract more corn production investment in small and
medium-sized farms in Mexico. 90 Mexican executive authorities have decided to
honor trade liberalization commitments and to take advantage of NAFTA by
increasing corn imports.9' What is more striking is that NAFTA has been included
in the main rhetoric for policy mechanisms. While influential leaders within the
Congress have pressured against opening the border to this commodity, the
administration intends to increase corn supplies from abroad and to comply with
the scheduled liberalization.
92
Once again we see that, as in the two examples cited before, in these critical
moments, authorities within the government have acknowledged Mexico's
international obligations. By relying on NAFTA as part of the solution to the corn
supply crisis, Calder6n's administrative action shows that international obligations
are relevant in defining the bureaucratic decision-making process. Moreover,
NAFFA, and compliance with it, has become an important part of Mexican politics
as well as debates over policy decisions.
introductions of corn and beans from abroad will be [duty] free").
89. Elisabeth Malkin, Thousands in Mexico City Protest Rising Food Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1,2007.
90. Miriam Posada & Matilde Perez, No Habrd Control de Precios para Frenar el Aumento a
las Tortillas: Sojo, LA JORNADA, Jan. 9, 2007. (Mr. Eduardo Sojo, (Secretary of
Commerce) detailed the agenda [...] that considers subsidies to different sectors of the
internal market and to exporters as well; furthermore, it attempts to attract more foreign
investment and the strengthening of small and middle size businesses).
91. Mexico Cuts 'Tortilla Tax', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/01/1 3/world/americas/13mexico.html.
92. Exhorto al Ejecutivo Federal a Establecer Mecanismos para Estabilizar el Precio de los
Granos, Gaceta Parlamentaria, ahio X, ntimero 2170, Jan. 11, 2007.
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E. Some Remarks on the Net Effects of NAFTA in State Behavior
The early years of the 21" century demand that we pay special attention to the
international institutions that have been created to deal with global affairs.
Effective and fair international trade can help in the development of economies and
improve living conditions as well as the quality of life in developing nations.
International legal scholars should pursue careful analysis of the consequence of
international law and institutions, and push for more effective legalization. If
international law is ineffective, the role of power in world affairs increases. This
scenario might not be a desired outcome for many of us who believe in the power
of international law.
While NAFTA has not been the panacea to remedy Mexico's deep structural
problems, a balanced view of the effects of the legalization of trade relationships
requires an analysis of both economic and political effects. Thirteen years ago,
relationships in North America were cordial and friendly as they are now, but
power politics dominated the regional agenda. However, in the view of some
scholars, a recent trend suggests that NAFTA style-legalization has "helped the
management of Canadian, Mexican and U.S. relations [since] agreed rules and not
power politics, has determined the outcomes." 93 This can be observed from the
relatively low number of disputes, the preference for using trade mechanisms,
compliance with the dispute mechanisms bodies' findings by the three States in
almost all the cases and even policy changes in some cases.94
Of course, there have been exceptions where power has still trumped
international law. Conflicts like the Mexico-U.S. Sweeteners Dispute, and the
U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute, in which investment-disputes, bi-national
panel decisions, extraordinary challenges, remand and revision and in general
never-ending litigation demonstrate the limitations of legalization. 95
There is no question that authorities in Mexico have learned to deal with
difficult policy decisions in a global and liberalized economy. In the following
sections this paper argues that some evidence presented suggests the need for
further, deeper analysis of the impact of legalization in three different ways.
However, this conclusion should not be without qualification, in light of Mexico's
unique political-economy dynamic and other economic, cultural and political
93. Gustavo Vega C. & Gilbert R. Winham, The Role of NAFTA Dispute Settlement in the
Management of Canadian, Mexican and U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 28 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 651 (2002).
94. See id. at section 4-b. (e.g., changes in labor, environmental and fiscal regulation).
95. Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA "Spaghetti
Bowl" is Cooking, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 197, 203 (2006).
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changes. Also, this article is not an attempt to assess all the consequences of the
Agreement, but only to point to some interesting dynamics where the Agreement
has been relevant.
F. Constraint and Guidance in Decision-Making Processes
As discussed earlier, the Mexican government's response to the 1995 peso crisis
was driven by its liberalization program and by taking advantage of the recently
adopted NAFTA. A response urging foreign long-term investment, efficient
substitution of imports, and increase of trade was applauded and ultimately
effective. Not only the initial response from Zedillo's administration, but also the
eventual financial system's restructuring, avoided discriminatory actions and
enhanced Mexico's international credibility. Given that Mexico depended greatly
on an international constituency, i.e. the United States, to solve the peso crisis,
credibility and commitment to its liberalization decision were essential for the
success of the recently adopted economic model. Moreover, avoiding specific
decisions to honor Mexico's NAFTA obligations clearly shows the impact of
international law on bureaucratic decisions.
The second case of the sugar tax demonstrates an even greater example of an
international framework impacting national decision-making. Not only did
President Fox respond by suspending the openly discriminatory tax - expressing
the reasoning behind the suspension - but some influential figures within the
Congress also opted for a tax measure to avoid a "direct" violation of the
agreement. This suggests a behavioral response of the Congress to the new rules
of the game. In other words, political leaders within the Mexican Congress
understand a two-tier game provided by national and international law, thus using
policy devices like tax bills that enjoy a higher degree of discretion while
providing adjustment assistance for import-competing industries. Ultimately, in
the sweeteners case, the tax was declared illegal by the WTO. However, it would
not be surprising if in the future, tax policy is used by the Congress to a greater
extent in dealing with unpopular international trade commitments.
The last case of the 2006 elections, while simpler and subject to further
developments, at least signals that Mexico's current administration seeks guidance
in liberalization principles and from NAFTA to manage sector crises. A political
battle is expected to surround compliance with the tariff schedule for corn next
year96 and, in this instance, perhaps international law will be used to confront local
96. Interview with Beatriz Leycegui, Mexico's Under-Secretary for Trade Negotiations,
Mexico City, Mexico (Nov. 23, 2006 ).
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politics. Both the Mexican Congress and the executive will face the battle
considering the provision of NAFTA, thus, showing that in calculating different
courses of actions, Mexico's political behavior has been constrained by NAFTA.
The above case studies suggest that in dealing with crises, political or
economic, federal executive authorities in Mexico respond to international
obligations. On the one hand, NAFTA appears to be a politically useful way of
dealing with democratic tensions and suggesting certain courses of action. While
on the other hand, they grant tools to limit national pressures by suggesting a
particular course of action that differs from the administration's popular agenda.
In other words NAFTA acts also as a "tying the hand device.'
97
While proponents of democratic values have good reasons to view the "tied
hands device" rhetoric with suspicion, Congressional behavior could be adjusting.
At first glance it might seem that in politically contentious battles or policy
decisions, the executive branch in Mexico has appealed to international law to
strengthen its case. For the Mexican executive, NAFTA has served as a series of
commitment devices to be used in combating political pressure from leaders who
demand backtracking in economic liberalization. However, a deeper look also
confirms that the Congress has also adapted to this game and responded
strategically. In the new political game created by these international obligations,
the Congress has also modified its behavior. Some of these facts may signal that,
as the liberal scholars suggest, international instruments can help guide local
politics.
The executive's recent decisions resolving conflicts may have been
economically motivated. Under this argument, the economic incentives
determined the response, not the NAFTA agreement itself. The peso crisis
response left Mexico better positioned than other countries in similar situations,
e.g. Argentina. Had the Congress lifted the HFCS Tax as demanded by the
executive, Mexico would not be facing potential international liabilities of nearly
525 million US dollars.9 8 In the last case, experts even suggested that Mexico
should anticipate the phasing out of tariffs on corn to avoid further economic
97. See Eric Reinhardt, Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes, 45:2 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 174 (Apr. 2001) (concluding that "international institutions do indeed
affect policymaking by changing the incentives for domestic actors, but not in a way
imagined [... ] by tying hands occur in proportion to the ex ante probability of enforcement,
even if enforcement is not forthcoming in a given case").
98. See Pauwelyn, supra note 95. As stated before, three US sweetener companies (Corn
Products, ADM/Stantley and Cargill) initiated proceedings against Mexico under Chapter
11. Together they seek a total of US $525 million.
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damages. 99 However, the claim of this article is slightly different. In spite of the
economic incentives, the incorporation of NAFTA into the political rhetoric, the
open statements of government officers about potential liabilities, and strategic
behavior of the Congress show institutional caution and the responses to trade
agreements. In this sense, NAFTA can be considered a new element that officials
in both the executive and legislative branches must deal with in the exercise of
their authority
G. Trade Agreements and Strategic Bargaining in Political Behavior
As explained before, scholars writing under a liberal tradition of international
law view legalization as a limitation on strategic behavior. Strategic behavior
concerns the use of international agreements by decision makers to act on the basis
of principled beliefs, and not solely on rational and calculated decisions.'00 In an
ideal scenario, compliance with international agreements will not be decided on the
possibility of a sanction, but rather as a result of the belief that in the long-run it is
beneficial and convenient to act in such a way.
Certainly this prediction has been more difficult to appreciate in a context like
NAFTA. Indeed, the examples described before may suggest otherwise. NAFTA
has encouraged an interesting political-economy dynamic demanding new courses
of action when the democratic consensus is incomplete. The Mexican executive
seems to take advantage of an international framework when arguing in favor of a
certain course of action the executive prefers. Whether the motivation is to avoid
the political pressure (the hands tied strategy), to avoid international sanctions, or
is a result of the Agreement's concurrence with the administration's policies, the
Mexican executive's behavior has been impacted by NAFTA. The Mexican
Congress has responded to this game by extending the use of fiscal policy or
limiting the trade authority it gives to the executive.'0 ' Thus, the strategic use of
the Agreement within domestic politics is present, and it is indisputable that both
the Congress and the executive are responding and adjusting to it. It is apparent
that NAFTA has played an important role in this. Less clear, however, is whether
the principles and values engrained by free trade have determined these actions.
Some hypotheses help explain why this prediction was not observed earlier.
99. Sergio Sarmiento, Maiz y Mercado, REFORMA (Jan. 15, 2007) (quoting Dr. Luis de la Calle,
former Under-Secretary for international trade negotiations of Mexico).
100. See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 9.
101. See, e.g., Ley Sobre la Aprobaci6n de Tratados Internacionales en Materia Econ6mica,
D.O. Sept. 2, 2004, for the adoption of the new legislation establishing limitations on the
executive branch in the celebration of international economic agreements.
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First, NAFTA and the reforms were conducted under an elevated degree of
isolation, without meaningful political discussions or any real democratic
consensus. 102 Thus NAFTA lacks complete consensus, at least in Mexico, and
when this is combined with the strengthening of some political forces and limited
economic growth, the Agreement has created a political market to oppose the
values and principles established by economic neo-liberalism.
The second explanation could be related to the subject matter of NAFTA. As
opposed to human rights or non-proliferation agreements, the value of free trade
agreements is perceived very differently by a large constituency. Indeed, in a 2005
survey, the percentage of Mexicans who considered NAFTA more beneficial to
foreign interests was greater than those who perceived NAFTA to benefit Mexico
more. 10 3 Therefore, this lack of acceptance creates grounds for the use of the
agreement in a politically strategic way.
Lastly, Abbott's reference to governmental behavior constraints could be
describing a unitary actor in its interaction with other States. Yet, the reality is that
when it comes to trade issues, sub-state actors have different views as to what is in
the State's best interest depending on their individual preferences. In this process,
the national interest is subordinated and partisan politics create incentives for
actions that will not be in the best interest of the country.
III. Conclusion
This analysis suggests that NAFTA has impacted Mexico not only in economic
terms. It also suggests that it has provided a vehicle for political reform in Mexico.
This is perhaps, in part, due to the contribution of legalization of international law
as a mechanism for controlling political behavior. More importantly, legalization
in international law and trade regulation has instigated important new dynamics
into Mexico's politics, evidenced by the behavior of government officials in
different kinds of crises.
Three effects of legalization and NAFTA can be identified in the context of this
paper. First, some evidence suggests that NAFTA works as a constraint of
political behavior and as a guide for governmental decisions. In the three cases
102. Judith Adler Hellman, Mexican Perceptions of Free Trade: Support and Opposition to
NAFTA, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 193, 196
(Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron eds., 1993).
103. Centro de Investigaci6n y Docencia Econ6micas (CIDE) et al, Mdxico y el Mundo:
Visiones Globales 2004. Opini6n P6blica y Politica Exterior en Mrxico y Estados Unidos:
Un Estudio Comparado, available at http://www.consejomexicano.org/download.
php?id=878671,186,2.
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analyzed, the executive branch of the Mexican government has relied on the
Agreement in determining what course of action to pursue. The President, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the National Banking and Securities Commission all
expressly cited NAFTA in describing their reasoning behind certain decision.
Thus, the Agreement worked as a policy device dealing with tensions between the
executive and legislative branches, and was fully vested into the rhetorical of the
policy decisions. This was demonstrated, in the first case, by establishing a course
of action during the 1995 financial crisis; in the second case, by responding against
discriminatory measures in the sweeteners sector crises; and finally, in the third
case, by opening market access in the case of shortage of corn.
The second effect can be more puzzling for international law scholars. NAFTA
seems to have granted the executive a tool to deal with political pressures and the
defiance of the Congress. Evidence suggests that NAFTA was utilized by the
executive branch as a "tying the hands" device to oppose exchange controls and
protectionism in 1995, to suspend the HFCS Tax and to oppose import controls in
2002, and, to a certain degree, to respond to price controls of corn and tortilla
pressures. While this argument is by no means new, the evidence of this article
should be followed-up by further research to understand the use of NAFTA as a
rhetorical tool to dissuade protectionist pressures.
Finally, NAFTA, together with many other legislative, economic and political
reforms, has contributed to what seems to be a change in the political dynamics of
Mexico. NAFTA has promoted the Congress' anticipation of the employment of
international economic agreements in the executive's decision making process and
the Congress' strategic decisions to combat this. The Mexican Congress seems to
be adapting - evidenced by their extending the use of fiscal policy, restricting the
budgetary and duty-free quotas allocation authority as well as delimiting the trade
authority to the executive. This adaptation to a new style of politics shows
important signs that international law is being embedded nationally in Mexico.
The relationship between international law and state actions is a complex one
and we cannot hope to provide useful policy advice with respect to international
law without understanding this relationship. However, this article suggests further
research to find concrete answers. This article should be interpreted with care; for
example, the fact that federal authorities have responded in this way by no means
concretely shows that international agreements have impacted the different
institutional levels of the government.
Finally, in spite of the qualifications raised above, some evidence in this article
may signal that some international scholars are correct in seeing international
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legalization as a factor of municipal reform, an important function of legalization.
Whether this new relationship between NAFTA, authority and political behavior is
good or bad depends, to a certain extent, on the role of the Mexican authorities and
courts to deal with some of these tensions. If these tensions are resolved with
transparent decisions, consider international obligations and follow due process
principles, Mexico could reduce its exposure to potential liability under the
international disputes settlement mechanisms of NAFTA.
